Especially in innovator, especially in in many companies, and how laissez faire sell side, especially investment bankers, especially brokers and sell side analysts take in, picking comparables do, variables, and I think that there is a problem facing the sell side that affects the valuation of buy side companies. I and needs to be addressed. Okay, this article is going to be about the problem with Southsiders valuing by siders through an early stage company lens. Okay, give the example with the Mandarin Oriental for instance. But how about let's do so. I'm sure, I'm sure my NDA is up. I'm sure it's not proprietary information anymore. However, just to be safe and polite, this company has already ipoed I I won't Give the company exactly, but I will give a fair equivalent, ironically and actually good comparable, and explain about bilateral thinking. And then, then, okay, I'm going to connect it to valuation. How in value, in valuation, there's a confirmation bias. Oh, my God, okay, the confirmation bias in finding comparables in valuation, especially with early startups. I I don't know how okay talk about the confirmation bias in a psychological sense, and how it relates to unfair comparables in startups. And give the example of Roxy and Hermes without you can say our mess, but not um perfect moment. Talk about TJ Maxx, though that would be good. Ah, but how about in? Okay, a number is given, especially in a price purchase, price allocation, where brokers are given a number, and once a number has stuck, just like a first impression has stuck, The company becomes contingent to that number and comparables all only further the narrative. The only truly correct way I would ever consider valuing a company would be through predictive DCF. But even then, that's predictive. But the income approach, however, that's difficult for early stage. So I think early stage has a I think I think sell side puts startups at a disadvantage. By being so close minded with their comparables and how it ended up in TJ Maxx, I.
